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A RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEM OF ELDER ABUSE:
FLORIDA'S REVISED ADULT PROTECTIVE SERVICES
ACT
CHRISTINE A. METCALF
N RECENT years increasing attention has been focused on
abuse of the elderly. Hearings and reports by the United States
House of Representatives Select Committee on Aging1 and news
reports of elder abuse, neglect, and exploitation2 have prompted
many states to enact some form of adult protective services legisla-
tion.3 While specific provisions of these laws vary widely from state
1. See, e.g., SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH AND LONG-TERM CARE OF THE AGING, HOUSE SELECT
COMM. ON AGING, ELDER ABUSE: A NATIONAL DISGRACE, Comm. Pub. No. 99-502, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1985); HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, ELDER ABUSE (AN EXAMINATION OF A HID-
DEN PROBLEM), Comm. Pub. No. 97-277, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter cited as
HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING 1981 REPORT]; see also Elder Abuse: Joint Hearing Before
the Senate Comm. on Aging, 95th Cong., 2d Seas. (1980).
2. See, e.g., Elderly Losing Property, Cash to 'Trusted' Helpers, Orlando Sentinel, Nov.
4, 1985, at Al, col. 1; Agencies Battle Problems of Elderly-Care Cases, Ft. Lauderdale
News, July 14, 1985, at 1B, col. 2.
3. Some confusion exists about exactly how many states have this type of legislation.
This confusion results from varying definitions of what constitutes "adult protective ser-
vices" legislation. For the purposes of this Comment, "adult protective services" legislation
refers to any legislation designed to address abuse, neglect, or exploitation of elderly persons
in noninstitutional settings.
At this time, 38 states have passed such legislation. See Alabama: ALA. CODE §§ 38-9-1
to -11 (Supp. 1985); Alaska: ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.24.010-.100 (1984); Arizona: ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 46-451 to -454 (Supp. 1985); Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-1301 to -1313
(Supp. 1985); California: CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 9380-9387 and §§ 15600-15745
(Supp. 1986); Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 26-3.1-101 to -105 (Supp. 1985); Connecti-
cut: CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46a-14 to -25 (Supp. 1986); Florida: FLA. STAT. §§ 415.101-.112
(1985); Hawaii: HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 349C-1 to -8 (Supp. 1984); Idaho: IDAHO CODE §§ 39-
5201 to -5212 (1985); Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 6301-6510 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1986); Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. §§ 4-27-7-1 to -14 (Burns Supp. 1985); Iowa: IOWA CODE §
235B.1 (Supp. 1985); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-1421 to -1429 (Supp. 1985); Ken-
tucky: Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 209.010- .150 (1982); Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403.2
(West 1986); Maryland: MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 14-101 to -309 (Supp. 1985); Massa-
chusetts: MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 19A, §§ 14-24 (West Supp. 1986); Michigan: MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 400.11 (West Supp. 1986); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.557
(West Supp. 1986); Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 43-45-1 to -31 (Supp. 1985); Mis-
souri: Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 455.010-.045 (Vernon 1986); Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 53-5-
501 to -525 (1985); Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 200.5091-.5099 (1986); New Hampshire:
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161-D:1-:6 (Supp. 1985); New York: N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 473
(McKinney 1985); North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 108A-101 to -106 (1985);
Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, §§ 801-810 (West Supp. 1985); South Carolina:
S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-29-10 to -100 (Law. Co-op. 1985); South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. §§ 22-46-1 to -4 (Supp. 1986); Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 14-25-101 to -111
(Supp. 1985); Texas: TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 48.001-.084 (Vernon Supp. 1986);
Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 55-19-1 to -10 (Supp. 1985); Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§
1150-1159 (Supp. 1985); Virginia: VA. CODE §§ 63.1-55.2 to 55.7 (1980); Washington:
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to state, most include reporting of suspected abuse and provision
of social services to abused adults. States without such laws gener-
ally rely on traditional statutory guardianship procedures.
Adult protective services legislation is usually a compromise be-
tween the desire to protect individuals and respect for rights of
privacy, liberty, and self-determination. Unlike children, who are
considered incompetent under the law, adults are vested with full
civil rights,5 and only when the state's interest in protecting the
individual from abuse outweighs an individual's rights may the
state interfere.6
It is difficult to assess the true extent of the elder abuse problem
because prior to the implementation of protective laws little data
was available.7 Generalizations from existing data are troublesome
because state definitions of abuse and of those who need protective
services differ.8 Although several studies have been conducted on
elder abuse, analysis based on their findings is inconclusive be-
cause of the varying criteria and methodologies used.9
Abuse is not confined to the elderly in nursing homes or similar
institutions; it occurs at home by a relative or by an informal care-
taker. 10 It is estimated that as many as one million older people are
abused each year.1" This number is likely to increase as the popu-
lation of elderly adults increases. In 1980, more than twenty-five
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 74.34.010-.900 (Supp. 1986); Wisconsin: Wis. STAT. ANN. §§
55.001-.007 (West Supp. 1985); Wyoming: WYo. STAT. §§ 35-20-101 to -109 (Supp. 1985).
Although some adult protective services statutes, including Florida's, include disabled
adults as well as the elderly, this Comment will focus only on the problems of the elderly.
4. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.040 (Vernon 1986).
5. Katz, Elder Abuse, 18 J. FAM. L. 695, 717 (1980).
6. The ability of the state to interfere in the lives of individual citizens for their own
protection is based on the doctrine of parens patriae. See generally Horstman, Protective
Services for the Elderly: The Limits of Parens Patriae, 40 Mo. L. REV. 215 (1975).
7. In compiling its 1981 Report, the House Select Committee on Aging found that many
states had no data on elder abuse. HOUSE SELECT. COMM. ON AGING 1981 REPORT, supra note
1, at xiv. Furthermore, all but one of the existing state statutes addressing the issue have
been enacted since 1973. See H. Havemeyer, Adult Protection Laws: A Critique (Jefferson
County, Colo., Dep't of Social Services) (July 1984) (on file, Florida State University Law
Review).
8. See generally H. Havemeyer, supra note 7.
9. See NATIONAL PARALEGAL INST., ELDER ABUSE AND NEGLECT: A GUIDE FOR PRACTITION-
ERS AND POLICY MAKERS (1981); Katz, supra note 5, at 697; see also NATIONAL SENIOR CITI-
ZENS LAW CENTER, ELDER ABUSE: PUaLIC POLICY OPTIONS OTHER THAN DIRECT SERVICE DE-
LIVERY (1983).
10. Katz, supra note 5, at 696; see also HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING 1981 REPORT,
supra note 1; Agencies Battle Problems of Elderly-Care Cases, Ft. Lauderdale News, July
14, 1985, at lB, col. 2.
11. HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING 1981 REPORT, supra note 1.
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million Americans were sixty-five years of age or older.12 By the
year 2000, that number is expected to reach thirty-five mil-
lion-about 13% of the population.'" Unfortunately, it has also
been estimated that only one of six adult abuse cases is reported."'
Women and adults age seventy-five or older appear to be most at
risk.'5
Florida has the greatest concentration of elderly adults of any
state.'" Of the 22,485 reports of adult abuse, neglect, or exploita-
tion in Florida during 1985, of which 56% were confirmed,'" 43%
involved abuse in private homes.'" Of the 22,485 reports, 52% in-
volved neglect, 18% physical abuse, 15% emotional abuse, 10%
threats of physical harm, and 6% financial exploitation.' 9 Florida
data confirm that women and adults over seventy-five are more
likely to be abused. 0
There are numerous theories about the causes of elder abuse."
The most frequently articulated is that abuse results from the
emotional, physical, and financial stress of caring for the depen-
dent elderly.2 As life expectancy increases, so does the number of
elders that need care. This phenomenon requires more middle-
aged adult children to assume responsibility for their parents-just
when their own children have moved out of the home and they are
nearing retirement age themselves.23 However, with the steady de-
12. Numbers Show Aging of America, Tallahassee Democrat, Feb. 17, 1985, at 1A, col. 1.
13. Id.
14. HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING 1981 REPORT, supra note 1, at xix.
15. Id. at xx; see also NATIONAL PARALEGAL INST., supra note 9, at 11.
16. W. SCHMIDT, K. MILLER, W. BELL & B. NEW, PUBLIC GUARDIANSHIP AND THE ELDERLY
143 (1981).
17. FLORIDA DEP'T OF HEALTH & REHAB. SERVS., SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF REPORTS
OF ABUSE, NEGLECT, OR EXPLOITATION OF ADULTS RECEIVED IN FLORIDA (Table 1) (1986) (on
file, Florida State University Law Review). Because Florida's Adult Protective Services Act
includes disabled persons, these figures reflect abuse of the disabled as well as abuse of the
elderly.
18. Id.
19. FLORIDA DEP'T OF HEALTH & REHAB. SERVS., PERCENTAGES OF TYPES OF MALTREAT-
MENT REPORTED FOR INDICATED CASES (Table 2) (1986) (on file, Florida State University
Law Review).
20. FLORIDA DEP'T OF HEALTH & REHAB. SERVS., VICTIMS' AGES (PERCENTAGES) FOR 1974
TO PRESENT IN FLORIDA (Tables 4 & 5) (1986) (on file, Florida State University Law
Review).
21. NATIONAL PARALEGAL INST., supra note 9, at 15.
22. See Katz, supra note 5, at 700. Contra Pillemer, The Dangers of Dependency: New
Findings on Domestic Violence Against the Elderly (Feb. 1985) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file, Florida State University Law Review).
23. See NATIONAL PARALEGAL INST., supra note 9, at 18; NATIONAL SENIOR CITIZENS LAW
CENTER, supra note 9, at 15; Katz, supra note 5, at 702.
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crease in family size and the increased geographic mobility of our
society, fewer family members are available to care for elderly rela-
tives or to support those who have accepted that responsibility.24
Aggravating this situation are the negative attitudes toward the
elderly and disabled which pervade our society.25 Certainly, the
complex causes of elder abuse must be considered when designing
a legal response to the problem.
Florida law has included adult protective services provisions
since 1977.26 Concerns persisted, however, about the adequacy of
protection for due process rights of the elderly adults served. Prior
to the 1986 Regular Session, House and Senate committees, the
Florida Committee on Aging, and the Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services undertook the ambitious task of reviewing
and revising the existing adult protective services law.27 The sub-
stantially revised Adult Protective Services Act was passed by the
legislature as part of an omnibus bill, Committee Substitute for
House Bill 1313.28 The revised Act clarifies definitions; provides
detailed procedures and greater due process safeguards for the
abused and the alleged abuser; facilitates the provision of protec-
tive services by providing easier access to victims and involuntary
removal from an abusive environment in emergency situations; and
mandates greater interagency cooperation in the reporting, investi-
gation, and prosecution of elder abuse, neglect, or exploitation.29
These revisions make the Florida Adult Protective Services Act
one of the most progressive in the nation.
In this Comment the author traces the history of elder abuse
legislation in Florida and other states. Florida's revised Adult Pro-
tective Services Act is examined in detail with discussion of its leg-
islative history and analysis of the revisions. The author also ad-
dresses concerns regarding the adult protective services response to
elder abuse and the extent to which the new Florida legislation
succeeds in answering those concerns. Finally, changes to Florida's
Adult Protective Services Act and Guardianship Law are suggested
for future legislative consideration.
24. See NATIONAL PARALEGAL INST., supra note 9, at 18; Katz, supra note 5, at 702.
25. See NATIONAL PARALEGAL INST., supra note 9, at 18; Katz, supra note 5, at 703.
26. FLA. STAT. § 409.3631 (1977).
27. Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health & Rehab. Servs., HB 1328 (1986) Staff Analysis
2 (May 28, 1986) (on file with committee) [hereinafter cited as Staff Report].
28. Fla. CS for HB 1313 (1986). This Comment deals only with that part of the omnibus
bill which revised the Adult Protective Services Act.
29. Staff Report, supra note 27, at 2-9.
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I. SURVEY OF ELDER ABUSE LEGISLATION
Many states have enacted some form of elder abuse or protective
services legislation. 0 A typical definition of protective services is:
"services provided by the state or other governmental or private
organizations or individuals which are necessary to prevent abuse,
neglect, exploitation or abandonment."31 While state statutes vary
greatly, such legislation generally includes provisions for reporting
suspected abuse with assurance of immunity and confidentiality as
well as facilitated access by investigators to suspected victims of
abuse. Additionally, social and health services are provided either
with the consent of the victim-referred to as voluntary ser-
vices-or without consent-referred to as involuntary services.
Safeguards are also provided to prevent inappropriate interference
in the individual's rights of privacy and self-determination.2 The
safeguards used vary widely among the states."
Like child abuse and guardianship statutes, adult protective ser-
vices laws are based on the assumption that those covered by the
statute need special protection.3 4 Under the doctrine of parens pa-
triae, the state may impose protection if it is in the individual's
best interests.33 In our society, however, an adult of any age is pre-
sumed competent to control his life without paternalistic govern-
ment protection. Criminal and tort laws for assault, battery, fraud,
and similar offenses are considered sufficient protection.
For this reason, most states limit the operation of protective ser-
vices or adult abuse laws to those persons considered especially
vulnerable. While many state statutes are restricted to abuse of the
elderly,36 the trend in other states, including Florida, is to include
physically or mentally disabled adults.3 7 States also use different
criteria to determine who is protected; some states emphasize se-
30. See supra note 3.
31. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-14(4) (Supp. 1986). Some states provide a more specific defi-
nition of the types of services to be provided. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-1301(5) (Supp.
1985).
32. NATIONAL PARALEGAL INST., supra note 9, at 118.
33. H. Havemeyer, supra note 7, at 1.
34. NATIONAL PARALEGAL INST., supra note 9, at 119.
35. Id. See also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481
(Fla. 1977); Horstman, supra note 6, at 221.
36. An "elderly" or "aged" person is generally defined as one 65 years of age or older.
See, e.g., Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 47.24.100(6) (1984); Massachusetts: MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 19A, § 14 (Supp. 1986); Texas: TEx. HuM. RES. CODE ANN. § 48.002(1) (Vernon
Supp. 1986).
37. See, e.g., Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-19-1(1) (Supp. 1985); Wyoming: WYo. STAT. §
35-20-102(a)(vi) (Supp. 1985).
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nility or. infirmities of aging. This approach may overly restrict the
category of elderly served.38 Several state adult protective services
statutes do not limit the statute to especially vulnerable adults, or
base their definition of vulnerability solely on age.3 9 Without spe-
cific criteria, there is increased likelihood of inappropriate interfer-
ence with the rights of competent persons. Moreover, such statutes
could be unconstitutionally overbroad. Not all adults need the pa-
ternalistic attention of the state. Furthermore, to base such a defi-
nition on age alone merely perpetuates the stereotype of the in-
competent elderly person. Some states emphasize functional
incapacity, or an individual's inability "to provide adequately for
his own care or custody, or. . . to manage his property and affairs
effectively, or to carry out the activities of daily living, or to pro-
tect himself from abuse, neglect or exploitation."' 0 This is proba-
bly the best approach to defining which adults are particularly vul-
nerable, in that functional ability may be determined through
objective observation of the individual's recent behavior."' Critics
of this functional approach, however, are concerned that protective
services may be involuntarily imposed on competent adults who
are merely physically incapacitated. 2
States also differ as to what constitutes abuse, neglect, or ex-
ploitation. Physical injury is always included in the definition of
abuse. In some states, the existence of an injury may be sufficient
to show abuse.43 Other states require an injury to have been in-
flicted intentionally or negligently.4' Not all states recognize the
infliction of mental anguish or injury as abuse. 5 Some states that
do include "mental injury" require that it be quantifiable."6 Psy-
chological abuse should not be ignored by elder abuse statutes.
38. NATIONAL PARALEGAL INST., supra note 9, at 120.
39. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.24.100(2) (1984).
40. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 803(6) (West Supp. 1985).
41. See Nolan, Functional Evaluation of the Elderly in Guardianship Proceedings, 12
LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 210 (1984).
42. Regan, Protecting the Elderly: The New Paternalism, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1124
(1981). California also extends operation of its protective services law to adults whose finan-
cial limitations affect their functional ability. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15715(h) (Supp.
1986).
43. See, e.g., Arizona: ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-451 (Supp. 1985); Idaho: IDAHO CODE
§ 39-5202(4) (1985); Iowa: IOWA CODE § 235B.1 (Supp. 1985).
44. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-1301(2) (Supp. 1985).
45. See, e.g., Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 6303(F) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); Mis-
souri: Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.010(1) (Vernon 1986).
46. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1151(8) (Supp. 1985).
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Neglect is sometimes defined simply as the failure to provide ad-
equate food, shelter, medical care, and other basic necessities."'
However, some states require that failure to provide care must
have been negligent, with some states specifying the "reasonable
prudent person" standard.4 Some states include self-neglect
within the definition of neglect, while others either ignore self-neg-
lect or categorize it separately.49 It is important to include self-
neglect in a protective services statute because those in need of
such services are not only those abused by other people. At least
one state defines neglect as a "pattern of conduct resulting in dep-
rivation of services necessary to maintain minimum physical and
mental health. ' 50 This definition addresses an important concern.
An isolated instance of a family member striking an elderly adult
does not constitute abuse.51 Nor does a single occurrence of leaving
an elderly individual without supervision or care constitute neg-
lect.5 2 Evidence of a "repeated, deliberate pattern of mistreatment
or negligence" should be required before protective services work-
ers intervene.53 Few states, however, address this aspect of abuse
and neglect.54
States also include a definition of exploitation, generally defined
as "the illegal or improper use of an incapacitated adult or his re-
sources for another's profit or advantage. ' 55 A few states, however,
define exploitation only as the improper use of funds "which have
been paid by a governmental agency to an adult or to the caretaker
47. See, e.g., Wvo. STAT. § 35-20-102(a)(xi) (Supp. 1985).
48. See, e.g., Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 39-5202(8) (1985); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. §
39.1401(h) (Supp. 1985). A few states also use the willful standard for neglect. See, e.g., MD.
FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 14-101(2) (Supp. 1985).
49. Alabama: ALA. CODE § 38-9-2(7) (Supp. 1985) (self-neglect included under neglect
generally); Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-1301 (Supp. 1985) (no definition for neglect or
self-neglect); Maryland: MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 121(p) (Supp. 1985) (separate defini-
tion for self-neglect).
50. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-452(4) (Supp. 1985).
51. H. Havemeyer, supra note 7, at 4.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Minnesota is the only state recognizing that abuse is a recurring phenomenon. MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 626.557(2)(d) (Supp. 1983). Minnesota's definition of neglect is also very pro-
gressive, including not merely the absence of basic necessities, but also the likelihood of
absence of such necessities. MINN, STAT. ANN. § 626.557(2)(e)(2) (Supp. 1983). New Hamp-
shire recognizes neglect as a pattern of conduct. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161-D:2(v) (Supp.
1985).
55. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161-D:2(vi) (Supp. 1985).
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for the use or care of the adult. '56 This definition fails to protect
the personal resources of the elderly.
State adult protective service laws also differ as to who may be
charged with abuse, neglect, or exploitation. Many states restrict
the application of their statutes to the caretaker, or one who has
assumed responsibility for an elderly person.5 7 A typical definition
of a caretaker is "a person who is responsible for the care of an
elderly person as a result of a family relationship, or who has as-
sumed responsibility for the care of an elderly person voluntarily,
by contract, or by court order. '5 8 By limiting neglect to caretakers,
the state recognizes that only someone who has accepted the re-
sponsibility of caring for an elderly person, either permanently or
temporarily, should be held liable for the absence of care. Such
limitations make little sense in the context of abuse or exploita-
tion, which can be perpetrated by those without special responsi-
bility. Equally problematic, however, are those statutes that do not
limit the operation of abuse, neglect, or exploitation simply to the
caretaker. As a result, it is unclear who can be charged with neg-
lect. Theoretically, a neighbor having little contact with an elderly
person could be held liable. Such a. broad definition seems
unworkable.
The wide discrepancy between states as to what constitutes
abuse, neglect, or exploitation; who is covered by the statutes; and
who is to report abuse, makes it difficult to compile uniform data
on the extent of elder abuse. These dissimilarities lead to confu-
sion as to when abuse should be reported and increase the
probability of inappropriate intervention by social service agencies.
A. The Reporting of Abuse
A number of states require reporting by anyone who has "rea-
sonable cause to believe" that a vulnerable person has been
abused, neglected, or exploited.5 9 Other states require profession-
als, such as doctors, nurses, social workers, dentists, and sometimes
clergy, to report suspected abuse discovered in their professional
56. Ky. REV. STAT. § 209.020(8) (1982).
57. Some states address only neglect by a caretaker, while others restrict abuse and ex-
ploitation by caretakers as well. See, e.g., Alabama: ALA. CODE § 38-9-2(6),(7) (Supp. 1985)
(abuse and neglect); Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 47.24.100 (1984) (abuse, neglect, and economic
harm); Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.2 (1986) (abuse only).
58. ALASKA STAT. § 47.24.100(3) (1984).
59. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 39-5203(1) (1985).
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capacity.60 A few states have purely voluntary reporting provi-
sions.61 Most reporting statutes guarantee confidentiality and im-
munity from civil or criminal liability to those who in good faith
report suspected abuse.62
Despite requirements that professionals report suspected abuse,
few of the mandatory reporting laws address the problem of confi-
dentiality of communications between doctor and patient, or clergy
and confessor. Those that do provide that in cases of suspected
abuse, neglect, or exploitation such communication is not privi-
leged and may be admitted into evidence at any abuse proceed-
ing.63 This situation creates a serious conflict between the physi-
cian's or clergyman's professional and legal responsibilities. It has
been suggested that mandatory reporting provisions may discour-
age the elderly, who do not want governmental interference in
their lives, from seeking needed medical attention.6 4 Also, as pro-
fessionals are required to report suspected cases of abuse, physi-
cians and clergy could allegedly be liable for civil damages for fail-
ure to report.6 5 This threat could also increase unfounded reports
requiring investigation at state expense and result in unnecessary
invasions of privacy-especially as the standard of knowledge or
suspicion is the minimal "reasonable cause to believe."
Mandatory reporting laws have been criticized as an ineffective
response to the elder abuse problem.6 6 The theory behind
mandatory reporting of elder abuse, as with child abuse, is that
because vulnerable adults do not as often interact in society, abuse
is difficult to discover and address unless a third person, such as a
60. E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1152(a) (Supp. 1985). Arizona is unique in also requir-
ing persons who have responsibility for preparing financial records, such as attorneys or
accountants, to report suspected exploitation. ARIZ. REV. STAt. ANN. § 46-454(b) (Supp.
1985).
61. E.g., IOWA CODE § 235B(4)(a) (1985).
62. E.g., COLO. Rav. STAT. § 26-3.1-104(3) (Supp. 1985).
63. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-1312 (Supp. 1985). The privilege between husband and wife is
also usually abrogated. Of course, the privilege between attorney and client is maintained
even by those states abrogating all other professional privileges of confidentiality. E.g., id.
64. Faulkner, Mandating the Reporting of Suspected Cases of Elder Abuse: An Inap-
propriate, Ineffective and Ageist Response to the Abuse of Older Adults, 16 FAM. L.Q. 69
(1982).
65. Katz, supra note 5, at 713. The Arkansas statute mandates that those who willfully
fail to report, and are required to do so by law, "shall be civilly liable for damages proxi-
mately caused by such failure." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-1313(2) (Supp. 1985). On the other
hand, it is very difficult to determine who failed to report. This problem means penalties
designed to encourage reporting are probably ineffective. NATIONAL SENIOR CITIZENS LAW
CENTER, supra note 9, at 73.
66. See Faulkner, supra note 64, at 84; Katz, supra note 5, at 711.
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doctor or other professional, reports the suspected abuse. 7 Critics
of mandatory reporting charge that similar child abuse statutes
have not been very successful.68 Despite mandatory reporting laws,
many reports of suspected child abuse still come voluntarily from
those not required to report.6 9 Critics question the assumption that
competent elderly adults will not report abuse themselves. 70 Yet an
abused person may not report the abuse-a very rational decision
because the consequence of reporting can be forced removal from
the home and/or the commencement of guardianship pro-
ceedings.71
The assumption underlying mandatory reporting statutes ap-
pears to be that most people over a certain age are unable to make
rational decisions concerning their lives and what assistance they
may require. This is surprising in a society that prizes indepen-
dence and individual rights. Mandatory reporting laws may be
more appropriate where an adult has been declared incompetent
by a court-with full due process protection-and placed in the
guardianship and care of an individual or institution. In this situa-
tion the state interest in protecting the person is great and the
need to respect that person's full civil rights does not apply. Prior
to a determination of incompetency, however, special care must be
taken to respect individual autonomy. Once a report is filed, most
states require an investigation which typically includes a visit to
the elderly person's home.72 If the report cannot be substantiated,
some states require that it be expunged to protect the rights of
those accused of having abused an elder.7 3
B. Provision of Services
Social service workers have no legal access to the premises to
investigate or provide services without the consent of the caretaker
or the individual believed to have been abused .7 If consent is re-
67. See Katz, supra note 5, at 705. Faulkner disagrees with this assumption, questioning
whether elder abuse is in fact a "hidden problem." Faulkner, supra note 64, at 80.
68. Katz, supra note 5, at 706.
69. Faulkner, supra note 64, at 80.
70. Id. See also NATIONAL SENIOR CITIZENS LAW CENTER, supra note 9, at 74.
71. See Faulkner, supra note 64, at 84; Katz, supra note 5, at 711.
72. E.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 19A, § 18(a) (West Supp. 1986).
73. Sometimes the entire record is expunged. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 39-5203(3) (1985). In
general, however, only the identifying information such as name and address are eliminated,
and the other information is retained for data collection purposes. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 4-
27-7-9(b) (Burns Supp. 1985).
74. NATIONAL SENIOR CITIZENS LAW CENTER, supra note 9, at 37.
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quired, adult protective services laws generally provide a mecha-
nism, such as an injunction, to enable the investigator to gain ac-
cess to the person believed to have been abused. Some states
specifically allow forced entry by law enforcement authorities if the
caretaker refuses consent. 76
If it is determined after investigation that an elderly person is in
need, appropriate services may be provided with consent. Most
states do not allow protective services to be provided without con-
sent, or where consent has been withdrawn, unless the person is
found incompetent or incapacitated." A competent adult has the
right to refuse treatment.7 8
Some states require traditional guardianship proceedings before
providing involuntary services. 79 This requirement is especially dis-
turbing when a statute provides that services be rendered for those
unwilling to consent.80 Every state has some form of statutory
guardianship.81 Guardianship may be of the person, property, or
both.8 2 Being declared incompetent and having a guardian ap-
pointed reduces the ward to the legal status of a child. 8
Often there is no relative or friend to act as guardian. 4 For this
reason, some states have enacted public guardianship statutes. 5
Even where a relative is available, particularly when the estate is
large, a conflict may arise beween the interests of the relative act-
ing as guardian and those of the ward. Similarly, to avoid a conflict
of interest a public guardian should not be in the social service
delivery system or be able to petition for guardianship.8 6 There is
also concern that individuals with public guardians will be more
75. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 74.34.080 (Supp. 1986); see also NATIONAL PARALEGAL INST.,
supra note 9, at 121.
76. E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-19-5.5(7) (Supp. 1985).
77. E.g., WYo. STAT. § 35-20-105(b) (Supp. 1985).
78. See Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359
(Fla. 1980); Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978).
79. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.24.030(a) (1984).
80. E.g., MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 14-307(b) (Supp. 1985).
81. Mitchell, The Objects of Our Wisdom and Our Coercion: Involuntary Guardianship
for Incompetents, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1405, 1413 (1979).
82. Sherman, Guardianship: Time for a Reassessment, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 350, 351
(1980). A guardian of property is also called a conservator. Guardianship of the person in-
cludes decisions on residence, personal care, and what the ward will be permitted to do.
83. Id.
84. Schmidt, The Evolution of a Public Guardianship Program, 12 J. PSYCHIATRY & L.
349, 358 (1984).
85. See, e.g., Alabama: ALA. CODE § 26-2-50 (1975); Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. § 253.150
(1986).
86. Schmidt, supra note 84, at 359.
1986]
756 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:745
frequently institutionalized because that is the easiest way to de-
liver needed personal services.8 7 Public guardianship has had vary-
ing success; some state systems work very well, and others are
plagued with difficulties."8 It should be recognized, however, that a
public guardianship program is only as good as the statutory sys-
tem for determining who needs a guardian. 9
Critics contend that guardianship proceedings may be, in many
circumstances, an overreactive and inappropriate response to elder
abuse. The incapacity of the elderly person may be only tempo-
rary. Deprivation of food, water, or health care may cause depres-
sion or confusion.91 Despite the reversible nature of their condi-
tion, wards have lost control over their lives once they have been
declared incompetent. There are few appeals from determinations
of incompetency.92 Despite the availability of procedures to termi-
nate guardianship, legal competency is rarely restored. 3 The great-
est obstacle to restoration may be the lack of evidence that the
individual is capable of managing his personal or financial affairs;
this is because guardianship prevents him from doing so.e" Rather
than resolving the situation, traditional guardianship may only in-
crease the victimization of the elderly..
Using traditional guardianship proceedings when limited inter-
vention would alleviate the problem is contrary to the principle of
using the least restrictive alternative.96 Some states provide a sepa-
rate procedure similar to guardianship within their protective ser-
vices statutes, 7 but this could be of even greater concern because
the substitute statute may contain fewer due process protections. 8
Other states provide for appointment of a guardian with limited
authority, allowing the ward to retain most of his rights, 9" or man-
87. Mitchell, supra note 81, at 1441.
88. Schmidt, supra note 84, at 359.
89. Id.
90. See Horstman, supra note 6, at 234.
91. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR ADULTS 80 (Spr.
1982).
92. Mitchell, supra note 81, at 1425. Even if an appeal is taken, "the trial court decision
will, in practice, be affirmed on appeal if there is any evidence in the record to support it."
Id. (emphasis in original).
93. Id. at 1426.
94. Id.
95. NATIONAL SENIOR CITIZENS LAW CENTER, supra note 9, at 45.
96. See NATIONAL PARALEGAL INST., supra note 9, at 122; Horstman, supra note 6, at 263.
97. E.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-45-13 (Supp. 1985).
98. See Regan, supra note 42.
99. Sherman, supra note 82, at 367.
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date that only those involuntary services which are least restrictive
to liberty may be used.' °°
The problems inherent in the use of guardianship when an eld-
erly person is unwilling or unable to consent to services are com-
pounded by the frequently overbroad and vague statutory defini-
tion of incapacity. Some guardianship or adult protective services
statutes contain no definition of incapacity or similar terms.'0 ' In
some states old age alone is considered a cause of incapacity.'02 Old
age is not synonymous with mental incompetency, however, and
such provisions threaten to deprive competent as well as incompe-
tent adults of their constitutional rights.'03 In other states the defi-
nition is tied to functional incapacity, based on a specific physical
or mental condition.'0 4 Complete reliance on medical diagnosis re-
sults in confusion between medical and legal incompetency.' 0 5 In-
capacity is, in some jurisdictions, defined as "inability to make or
communicate responsible decisions concerning his person."106
Rather than a factual determination of functional incapacity, this
subjective, value-laden, and vague definition is open to abuse.'0
Case law supports the proposition that a competent adult has the
right to make unreasonable or irresponsible decisions.'08 For exam-
ple, the decision to refuse services cannot alone be used to deter-
mine incompetency.' 09 Recognizing the extreme vagueness of this
standard, the Supreme Court of Utah chose to interpret inability
to make "responsible decisions concerning his person" as the "de-
cision-making process . . . being so impaired that he is unable to
care for his personal safety or unable to attend to and provide for
such necessities as food, shelter, clothing, and medical care, with-
out which physical injury or illness may occur.""10 This interpreta-
tion diminishes the subjectivity of the standard and emphasizes
100. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 807(B) (West Supp. 1985).
101. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 235B.1 (1985).
102. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 63.1-55.2 (1980).
103. See Horstman, supra note 6, at 262.
104. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 38-9-2(4) (Supp. 1985).
105. Horstman, supra note 6, at 228.
106. AIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-451(3) (Supp. 1985) (adult protective services statute).
See also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.54.2 (Supp. 1986) (guardianship statute). This language is
also used in the Uniform Probate Code. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 5-101(1) (1969).
107. See NATIONAL PARALEGAL INST., supra note 9, at 120; Mitchell, supra note 81, at
1420-21. But see Regan, supra note 42, at 1124.
108. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
109. Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978). A few states specify this
in their statutes. E.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 473-a(ii)(b) (1985).
110. In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085, 1089 (Utah 1981).
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functional incapacity, which lends itself more readily to judicial
fact-finding based on the individual's recent behavior."' By using
this definition functional incapacity is not tied to an underlying
physical or mental condition. Thus the confusion between medical
and legal definitions of incompetency is avoided.
The serious consequences to individual civil rights in guardian-
ship or provision of involuntary services require that special atten-
tion be paid to procedural due process. This includes sufficient no-
tice, legal representation, the presence of the alleged incompetent
at an adversarial hearing, and a constitutionally sufficient eviden-
tiary standard of proof." 2 Not all relevant state statutes contain
these provisions.
The Supreme Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co.,"' held that to satisfy due process, notice of pending
court proceedings must be given in a manner "reasonably calcu-
lated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of
the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to pre-
sent their objections." Notice provisions in guardianship and pro-
tective services statutes range from forty-eight hours to ten days.""
Few states, however, address "the problem of the confused client
who may not appreciate the terms or importance of the legal docu-
ment conveying such notice.""15 Notice is typically only of the
hearing date, without explanation of the serious consequences of
the contemplated action." 6 Besides requiring clear notice of the
implications of a pending hearing, another approach is to mandate
notice to any known next-of-kin, as well as to a caretaker and/or
attorney.
Not all states mandate that the alleged incompetent be present
at the hearing." 7 Some states allow attendance or hearing require-
ments to be waived if injurious to the physical or mental well-be-
111. See supra text accompanying note 41.
112. Horstman, supra note 6.
113. 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
114. E.g., Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 808(c) (West Supp. 1985) (48 hours);
Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-19-4(7)(b) (Supp. 1985) (10 days).
115. Regan, supra note 42, at 1118.
116. Mitchell, supra note 81, at 1416. The Minnesota guardianship statute is an example
of requiring more specific notice. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.55.2 (West Supp. 1986).
117. E.g., Arizona: ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5303(b) (1956) (alleged incompetent enti-
tled but not required to attend); Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 14-25-107 (Supp. 1985)
(same).
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ing of the person."" At least one state, however, does provide that
failure to appear shall not be used to infer a waiver of the right to
appear. 9 Only severe physical incapacity should excuse attend-
ance, and some form of court supervision should be instituted to
prevent abuse of the system.2 0
Most states require that the alleged incompetent be represented
by counsel at guardianship or involuntary services hearings, but
not all mandate that counsel be appointed for those unable to af-
ford an attorney. 2 ' While many states recognize the right to adver-
sarial proceedings or trial by jury in incompetency hearings, these
practices are rarely used.' 22 This results from guardianship pro-
ceedings being based on the doctrine of parens patriae. 123 If ap-
pearance is not required or it is alleged that appearance by the
prospective ward would be injurious to his health, and no attorney
is present to represent the ward's interests, there can only be a
one-sided, ex parte hearing. An adversarial proceeding is essential
to protect the due process rights of the individual and prevent
abuse of the system.
The Supreme Court in Addington v. Texas12' declared that the
clear and convincing evidence standard was constitutionally suffi-
cient in civil commitment proceedings. Although the court left
open the possibility of states using a reasonable doubt standard,
use of that standard was discouraged because "given the uncer-
tainty of psychiatric diagnosis, it may impose a burden the state
cannot meet and thereby erect an unreasonable barrier to needed
medical treatment.' ' 26 Under that rationale, the clear and convinc-
ing evidence standard also would be appropriate in traditional
guardianship or involuntary protective services proceedings.2 6
That evidence should not include hearsay, which is frequently al-
lowed in incompetency hearings in the form of written medical
evaluations. 27
118. Mitchell, supra note 81, at 1417. See, e.g., Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 29-5-6(e)(1)
(1986) (attorney may waive hearing); Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-18-19 (Burns Supp.
1986) (same).
119. UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-19-4(7)(c) (Supp. 1985).
120. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.551.1 (West Supp. 1986).
121. Sherman, supra note 82, at 354.
122. Horstman, supra note 6, at 251.
123. Id. at 243.
124. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
125. Id. at 433.
126. But see Horstman, supra note 6, at 254 (arguing for use of reasonable doubt
standard).
127. Id. at 252.
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In emergency situations, some states allow specific emergency in-
tervention. 128 In states without emergency provisions, only mea-
sures for involuntary provision of services or guardianship are
available. Some statutes, however, provide that emergency proce-
dures are an alternative to full guardianship proceedings in non-
emergency situations where the person is unable to consent.129
Emergency is usually defined as "a situation in which an elderly
person is living in conditions which present a substantial risk of
death or immediate and serious physical or mental harm."'30 A
number of states provide for a separate court proceeding to obtain
an order for emergency services if the social service agency has
made a preliminary determination that the victim is unable to con-
sent.13' Protecting 4ue process rights in such court proceedings is
slightly different than in a nonemergency guardianship or involun-
tary services context. In determining when the state should inter-
vene, the state's interest in parens patriae must be weighed against
the individual's rights. In imminently life-threatening situations
the state has a substantial interest in protecting the individual,
and the strict requirements of due process may not apply.132 Nev-
ertheless, some states require as much as forty-eight hours notice
of a hearing on an emergency services order. 33 If the situation is
indeed imminently life-threatening, such notice seems unrealistic.
Some states do provide waiver of notice where "reasonably foresee-
able physical harm" would result from the delay. 34 Another solu-
tion is to provide the services or protective custody immediately,
with a hearing promptly afterward. 3 5 Of great concern, however,
are provisions, such as those in the Alabama statute, allowing in-
voluntary emergency services not only where the victim is incapac-
itated, but also where he is merely unwilling to consent.38
In keeping with the doctrine of the least restrictive alternative,
some states require that only those services necessary to remove
the emergency be provided. 37 Other states with emergency service
128. E.g., ALA. CODE § 38-9-5 (Supp. 1985).
129. E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 807(A) (West Supp. 1985).
130. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 19A, § 14 (West Supp. 1986).
131. E.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-45-15 (Supp. 1985).
132. See In re Byrne, 402 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1981).
133. E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 808(c) (West Supp. 1985).
134. Id.
135. South Carolina uses this approach. S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1-220 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1985).
136. ALA. CODE § 38-9-5 (Supp. 1985).
137. E.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-45-15(2) (Supp. 1985).
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provisions also require that the duration of the order be minimal
and frequently reviewed to determine when the emergency has
ceased and standard service provisions should apply. 38 A seventy-
two hour period is frequently used and seems appropriate. If at the
end of seventy-two hours the emergency persists, the court is al-
lowed to issue another order for an additional seventy-two
hours." 9 A determination that an elderly person is incapacitated in
the context of an emergency services order is not a determination
of complete incompetency. Instead it is an alternative to plenary
guardianship that does not strip the individual of his civil rights. A
temporary guardian with only limited authority is appointed.14 ° Fi-
nally, because of the limited and emergency nature of these orders,
it may be that a preponderance of the evidence standard is
sufficient.14'
When considering adult protective services or guardianship laws,
the presumed competency of an adult, at any age, must always be
remembered. One commentator cautions that "laws designed to
protect the elderly must not contribute to stereotyping of the aged
by treating them as incompetents who cannot make decisions re-
garding their own welfare."'"" Attention must be paid to providing
the services that alleviate the problem but least restrict the indi-
vidual. Because of the serious consequences of involuntary protec-
tive intervention or guardianship, due process protections must be
strictly observed.
II. FLORIDA'S ADULT PROTECTIVE SERVICES ACT
The history of the Florida Adult Protective Services Act began
in 1973 and culminated in the passage of the 1986 Act. The history
of the 1986 Act as well as its passage through the legislative pro-
cess is discussed.
A. Existing Law
In 1973, the Florida Legislature began to address the problem of
adult abuse in noninstitutional settings by providing legislation
138. E.g., WYO. STAT. § 35-20-107 (Supp. 1985).
139. E.g., TEX. HUM. REs. CODE ANN. § 48.061(e) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
140. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 63.1-55.6(4)(1980).
141. Contra NATIONAL PARALEGAL INST., supra note 9, at 129. Wyoming specifies a pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard in an emergency context. WYo. STAT. § 35-20-107(c)
(Supp. 1985).
142. Katz, supra note 5, at 704.
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"for the detection and correction of the abuse or maltreatment of
developmentally disabled persons." ' " This Act applied to persons
who suffered "from a condition of mental retardation, epilepsy,
cerebral palsy, or other disability which causes the person to be
substantially unable to protect himself from the abusive conduct of
others.' 1 44 The definition is based on a medical model, relying on
diagnosable disabilities rather than purely functional inabilities.
Arguably, only elder adults with a specific mental or physical disa-
bility would be covered by this statute.
At that time, abuse was defined as "neglect, malnutrition, physi-
cal or psychological injury inflicted other than by accidental
means, and failure to provide necessary treatment, habilitation,
care, sustenance, clothing, shelter, supervision, or medical ser-
vices.""" This definition lumped together neglect, abuse, and self-
neglect. The statute did not address any form of exploitation.
The 1973 Act required reporting by "[alny person, including, but
not limited to, any physician, psychologist, nurse, teacher, social
worker, employee of a public or private facility serving develop-
mentally disabled persons, or parent of such person" who believes
that there has been abuse.'4" Those reporting abuse were given im-
munity, and the records were not open to the public. No provision
was made for expunging unsubstantiated reports. The Act also dis-
allowed the physician/patient privilege, or any other except that
between attorney and client. The Department of Health and Reha-
bilitative Services (HRS) was required to perform "an immediate
investigation" and "when appropriate, notify the state attor-
ney. ' 147 The Act also referred to the responsibility of various pub-
lic agencies to "protect and enhance the welfare of abused," dis-
abled persons and those "potentially subject to abuse," but it was
unclear how that responsibility was to be exercised. This ambiguity
gave agencies freedom to use most any means to achieve those
ends, or they could do almost nothing.' 48 No provision was made
for involuntary services outside the traditional guardianship con-
text, for emergency situations, to provide access for investigation,
or to perform services where the caretaker refused to consent.
143. Ch. 731176, § 1, 1973 Fla. Laws 360 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 828.043(2) (1973)).
144. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 828.043(1)(a) (1973)).
145. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 828.043(1)(b) (1973)).
146. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 828.043(3)(a) (1973)).
147. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 828.043(6) (1973)).
148. Id.
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The first Florida Adult Protective Services Act was enacted in
1977.1"0 The legislative intent behind the Act was explicitly stated:
The Legislature recognizes that there are many adults in this
state, who because of the infirmities of aging, are in need of pro-
tective services. Such services should allow the individual the
same rights as other citizens, and at the same time protect the
individual from exploitation, neglect, abuse, and maltreatment. It
is the intent of the Legislature to provide for the detection and
correction of exploitation, neglect, abuse, and maltreatment, and
to establish a program of protective and supportive services for
all adults in need of them. In doing so, the Legislature intends to
place the least possible restriction on personal liberty and the ex-
ercise of constitutional rights, consistent with due process and
protection from abuse, exploitation, and maltreatment. 5 '
The 1977 Act covered those suffering from "infirmities of aging,"
which was defined as "organic brain damage, advanced age, or
other physical, mental or emotional disfunctioning in connection
therewith, to the extent that the person is substantially impaired
in his ability adequately to provide for his own care or protec-
tion."'' This definition focused on functional disability rather
than medical diagnosis. However, old age alone could cause the
functional disability.
Abuse was defined as depriving or allowing one "to be deprived
of food, clothing, shelter or medical treatment essential to his well-
being or. . . permitted to live in an environment, when such dep-
rivation or environment causes, or is likely to cause, the adult's
physical or emotional health to be significantly impaired."' 52 This
definition stressed deprivation of basic necessities and so differed
little from the definition of neglect in the earlier statute. One dif-
ference was that the neglect definition imposed a reasonable per-
son standard whereas the new abuse definition did not. Also, abuse
includes not only the actual deprivation, but also placement where
deprivation or injury is likely to occur. Without actual injury it is
difficult to see how placement can be considered abuse and be
criminally prosecuted. The Adult Protective Services Act also in-
cluded exploitation-absent from the earlier developmentally dis-
abled persons legislation.
149. Ch. 77-336, § 1, 1977 Fla. Laws 1421 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 409.3631 (1977)).
150. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 409.3632 (1977)).
151. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 409.3633(1) (1977)).
152. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 409.3633(3) (1977)).
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The 1977 Act contained a reporting provision nearly identical to
that in the previous legislation, and in fact referred back to the
earlier statute for the specific language. The Act also contained an
immunity provision for those reporting abuse, as well as confiden-
tiality of reports. The Act was silent, however, on the question of
professional privileges.
While no mention was made in the 1977 Act of HRS investiga-
tion of reports of abuse, the Act mandated that "[a]n individual
shall receive protective services voluntarily unless ordered by the
court.' ' 15 3 This provision implied that an investigation has been
conducted. Protective services were defined as:
[Tihose services the objective of which is to protect individuals
suffering from the infirmities of aging. Such protective services
shall include, but shall not be limited to, evaluation of the need
for services, arrangements for appropriate living quarters, ob-
taining financial benefits to which the person is entitled, or secur-
ing medical and legal services. In those situations where ex-
ploitation, prevention of injury, and protection of the person
and his property are at issue, protective services shall include
seeking the appointment of a guardian for the person or seeking
protective placement.54
This definition was extremely disturbing because it seemed to
mandate, in most instances, guardianship proceedings or commit-
ment to an institution. How many situations covered by this stat-
ute would not include "protection of the person and his property"?
No procedures for involuntary provision of services in nonemer-
gency situations were enumerated. The Act provided, however,
that an HRS worker could obtain an ex parte order to provide ser-
vices in emergency situations. The worker, along with law enforce-
ment officers, could enter the premises-forcibly if necessary-and
remove the person from the premises if removal was necessary to
prevent a life-threatening situation. To obtain the court order,
HRS must have had probable cause to presume that someone was
being abused, neglected, or maltreated. A hearing was required
within forty-eight hours after the emergency action in order to es-
tablish probable cause for continued provision of services. The
court could then order continued provision of services for up to
four days. There were no requirements that the victim be notified
153. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 409.3634(2) (1977)).
154. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 409.3633(2) (1977)) (emphasis added).
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of a hearing, his right to representation by counsel, or to be pre-
sent at the hearing. No specific effort was made to use a less re-
strictive alternative. Indeed, the definition of "protective service"
seems to mandate just the opposite.'55
In 1980 the developmentally disabled persons statute was
amended in several significant ways. The definition of those cov-
ered was expanded to include those "suffering from the infirmities
of aging."' 56 Furthermore, HRS was required to notify a human
rights advocacy committee within twenty-four hours of a report of
suspected abuse. Thus, within a specific period of time, some ac-
tion was required on the report, although the mandate to investi-
gate still contained the vague term "immediate investigation."
In 1983, the Adult Protective Services Act was combined with
the developmentally disabled persons legislation.'"" At that time
many significant changes and additions were made. The first, and
most obvious change, was the inclusion of both aged and disabled
persons. The definition of aged person was nearly identical to that
of infirmities of aging in the earlier act and the definition of dis-
abled person did not change. Abuse was modified to include "or is
subject to physical or psychological injury," a phrase taken from
the developmentally disabled persons legislation. 58  The
mandatory reporting provisions remained; the only changes were
the expansion of the list of professions required to report and the
inclusion of a toll-free number to report abuse to a central registry.
The confidentiality provisions were also greatly expanded, setting
forth in detail exactly who' could gain access to records and for
what purpose. The abrogation of all privileged communication ex-
cept that between attorney and client from the disabled persons
legislation was also incorporated.
Several changes were made in investigative and protective ser-
vices procedures. Specific provision was made for both immediate
protective investigation, included in the disabled persons legisla-
tion but absent from the Adult Protective Services Act, and the
requirement that the human rights advocacy committee be noti-
fied. Furthermore, the section relating to investigation was ex-
panded. When an investigation is complete, the local office of the
department was required to classify reports as either indicated or
155. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 409.3634(2) (1977)).
156. FLA. STAT. § 827.09(3)(b) (1985).
157. Id. § 415.101.
158. Id. § 415.102(1).
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unfounded. " Provision was also made for the identifying informa-
tion, such as name and address, to be expunged from the records
of unfounded reports, and, after seven years, from all indicated re-
ports. The legislature in 1984 added a requirement that HRS
orally notify law enforcement authorities immediately upon receiv-
ing a report of suspected abuse, so that a criminal investigation
could be conducted concurrently with the protective services inves-
tigation.16 The primary emphasis on criminal investigation of sus-
pected abuse clarified the purpose of the protective services inves-
tigation as protection of the victim rather than punishment of the
abuser. 6 ' The provision, however, required a criminal investiga-
tion, which may not always be the best response.
In 1985 the procedures for investigating suspected abuse were
further refined." 2 The legislature mandated that an investigation
begin within twenty-four hours rather than immediately. The rela-
tionship between HRS and law enforcement was further defined by
requiring notification of law enforcement authorities only after
HRS has investigated and determined that abuse was "perpetrated
by a second party." ' s This revision alleviated the burden on law
enforcement authorities by eliminating cases of self-neglect, and
allowed HRS more discretion in handling the case.
Lastly, a section was added which provided that spiritual treat-
ments do not constitute abuse. Though such treatment is not
abuse or neglect, it must still be reported, may be investigated by
the department, and, in certain circumstances, a court may order
certain health services provided."6 Similar provisions for spiritual
treatment are common in adult protective services statutes.1 5
During the interim preceding the 1986 session, the Senate Select
Committee on Aging, the Aging and Mental Health Subcommittee
of the House Health and Rehabilitative Services Committee, HRS,
and the Florida Committee on Aging appointed by the governor,
reviewed the existing legislation and suggested substantial
159. Id. § 415.103(3)(c).
160. Id. § 415.104.
161. HRS was also required to follow up notification of law enforcement with a written
report within five days. Id. § 412.104 (1985).
162. FLA. STAT. § 415.101 (1985).
163. Id. § 415.104(1).
164. Id. § 415.113.
165. See Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health & Rehab. Servs., Subcomm. on Aging & Mental
Health, tape recording of proceedings (Apr. 21, 1986) (on file with committee).
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changes. 166 The result is a completely revised Adult Protective Ser-
vices Act which became effective October 1, 1986.
B. Legislative History
In the House of Representatives, the Aging and Mental Health
Subcommittee of the Health and Rehabilitative Services Commit-
tee produced Proposed Committee Bill 1, revising chapter 415,
Florida's Adult Protective Services Act. The Subcommittee
adopted several amendments, including two title amendments, and
unanimously sent the bill to the full committee. 167 Proposed Com-
mittee Bill 1 was passed as revised by the full committee, filed as
House Bill 1328, and then referred to the House Appropriations
Committee.168
In the Senate, a companion bill, Senate Bill 1005, filed by Sena-
tor Malchon,1" was referred to the Senate Health and Rehabilita-
tive Services Committee. A similar bill filed by Senator Wein-
stein170 was combined with Senate Bill 1005 to create a committee
substitute, favorably reported by the committee.17 1 Committee
Substitute for Senate Bills 1005 and 121 was heard by the full Sen-
ate. Four amendments conforming the Senate bill to the House
version were proposed by the sponsor, Senator Malchon; three
amendments passed and Senator Malchon withdrew the other.172
With little debate, the bill passed173 and was sent to the House of
Representatives where it was referred to the House Health and Re-
habilitative Services Committee.
In the House Appropriations Committee, the House bill and sev-
eral other bills were amended onto a bill to reorganize the Depart-
ment of Health and Rehabilitative Services.17 4 Committee Substi-
tute for House Bill 1371 was reported out of the Appropriations
Committee and heard on the House floor. At that time several
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1986 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE
BILLS at 378, HB 1328.
169. Dem., St. Petersburg.
170. Dem., Coral Springs.
171. Fla. S., Comm. on Health & Rehab. Servs., tape recording of proceedings (Apr. 30,
1986) (on file with committee).
172. FLA. S. JOUR. 624 (Reg. Sess. June 4, 1986).
173. Id.
174. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1986 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE
BILLS at 378, HB 1328.
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other bills were amended onto the measure.175 As part of the larger
HRS reorganization bill which totaled 229 pages, there was little
specific discussion on the floor about the adult protective services
provisions. The House passed Committee Substitute for House Bill
1371,176 and sent it to the Senate, where it was referred to six com-
mittees.1 77 It passed the Senate Appropriations Committee and
was withdrawn from the others,178 but was never taken up by the
Senate. The House therefore amended the language of the bill onto
Committee Substitute for House Bill 1313, dealing with child sup-
port, which was then passed out of the House. 7' The Senate
passed Committee Substitute for House Bill 1313 without revision
in the waning hours of the session. 80
C. 1986 Legislation-Analysis
Precise definitions and detailed procedures are, perhaps, the
most important requirements for an effective adult protective ser-
vices law. Unless it is clear who is covered by the statute, and what
constitutes abuse, the probability of inappropriate interference is
greatly increased. Without detailed procedures, it is more likely
that due process rights will be violated. In 1986 the legislature sig-
nificantly revised the existing Adult Protective Services Act to
clarify statutory definitions and to detail procedures. Thus, it cre-
ated a law that should facilitate the investigation of abuse and pro-
vision of services by the least restrictive alternative, and provide
greater protection for due process.
The definition of protective services is expanded to refer to the
types of services included. Although protective placement is men-
tioned, emphasis is clearly on using the least restrictive alterna-
tives, including maintenance in the home where possible. The Act
applies to both aged persons and disabled adults. Aged persons are
only those "60 years of age or older," with certain functional disa-
bilities.'8 ' Disabled adults are those over eighteen years of age' 82
175. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 609 (Reg. Sess. May 29, 1986).
176. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 882 (Reg. Sess. June 4, 1986).
177. FLA. S. JouR. 663 (Reg. Sess. June 5, 1986).
178. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1986 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE
BILLS at 383, HB 1371.
179. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 641 (Reg. Sess. May 30, 1986) (amendment 5 to Senate amendment
1).
180. FLA. S. JOUR. 747 (Reg. Sess. June 5, 1986).
181. Ch. 86-220, § 28, 1986 Fla. Laws 1603, 1629 (amending FLA. STAT. § 415.102(3)
(1985)).
182. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 415.102(7) (1985)).
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with "physical or mental incapacitation due to developmental disa-
bility, organic brain damage or mental illness." '183 The revised law
lacks the previous catch-all provision of "other disability."
Abuse is redefined as the infliction of "physical or psychological
injury," and "the failure of a caregiver to take reasonable measures
to prevent the recurrence" of such injury.184 This change shifts the
emphasis from deprivation of necessities, covered by neglect, to ac-
tual physical or mental injuries, not merely those likely to occur.
Abuse is defined to recognize the caregiver's responsibility to pre-
vent abuse by others. 18 5 The 1986 revisions add a fairly detailed
definition of who may be considered a caregiver, including any per-
son, relative, neighbor, or staff of facilities such as nursing homes,
who has permanent or temporary custody of an aged person or dis-
abled adult at the time of the abuse.18
Neglect is redefined as failure of a caregiver to provide certain
necessary care and services, rather than merely to "exercise a de-
gree of care and caution that a prudent person would deem essen-
tial. 1 87 This standard demands a higher degree of care than was
previously required. Specific items such as medicine are included
as examples of what care is necessary.
Exploitation is limited to "improper or illegal use" of "funds, as-
sets, or property" or misuse of "power of attorney or guardian-
ship. '" '18 8 This stress only the economic and fiduciary aspects of ex-
ploitation. Exploitation of the person is not addressed.
Florida continues to mandate reporting of suspected abuse. The
1986 changes only detail the information to be included in the re-
port, and delete an unenforceable provision requiring that oral re-
ports of abuse be put in writing within forty-eight hours. As long
as Florida mandates reporting of suspected abuse of competent
adults, fundamental issues such as invasion of privacy will be
implicated.1 81
Important changes in record-keeping procedures were made. In-
vestigation of an abuse report must begin within twenty-four
hours, and be completed within thirty days. A new provision allows
183. Id.
184. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 415.102(1) (1985)).
185. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. The new Florida Act uses the term,
"caregiver" instead of "caretaker."
186. See supra text accompanying note 58.
187. Ch. 86-220, § 28, 1986 Fla. Laws 1603, 1630 (amending FLA. STAT. § 415.102(12)
(1985)).
188. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 415.102(8) (1985)).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 59-71.
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photographs or X-rays taken with the consent of the person or his
guardian as evidence of abuse. Once an investigation is completed,
HRS must notify the alleged victim, the guardian or caregiver, and
the alleged perpetrator of the results and the right to appeal. 190
Identifying information on unfounded reports must be expunged
within thirty days of determination. Another provision allows the
victim or alleged perpetrator to request that records be expunged
because they are inaccurate, and gives the right to an administra-
tive hearing if the request is denied. 191 These changes illustrate the
legislature's recognition of the rights of the alleged perpetrator.
The new Act requires HRS to notify the state attorney's office
when there is reason to believe abuse has been committed. 92 The
existing law required notification when the HRS made a determi-
nation regarding second-party involvement. That implied a higher
standard. Revisers considered a probable cause standard, 193 but
the language was amended in the House Subcommittee,194 despite
concerns that the new standard would be insufficient to support a
criminal investigation. 9 " Because only criminal investigation is in-
volved, rather than a specific invasion of rights such as a search, a
probable cause requirement is probably too stringent a stan-
dard-one that would significantly limit the number of criminal
investigations of abuse. A "reason to believe" standard requires an
identifiable reason, but also gives HRS discretion in determining
when a criminal investigation is warranted.
The issue of access is addressed by several provisions in the re-
vised Act. If a caregiver denies investigators or service providers
access to a suspected victim, HRS may petition the court to enjoin
the caregiver from further interference. 9 However, there must be
clear and convincing evidence of the need for an injunction. Where
the victim is consenting and competent, the need for such a high
standard is unclear.
190. Ch. 86-220, § 29, 1986 Fla. Laws 1603, 1632 (amending FLA. STAT. § 415.103(3)(c)
(1985)).
191. Fla. HB 995 (1986); see Imhof & Levine, Impact of the Information Age on Access
and Dissemination of Government Information in Florida, 14 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 635 (1986).
192. Ch. 86-220, § 30, 1986 Fla. Laws 1603, 1634 (amending FLA. STAT. § 415.104(4)
(1985)).
193. Fla. H.R. PCB HRS 86-1 (1986) (draft of Feb. 14, 1986).
194. Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health & Rehab. Servs., Subcomm. on Aging & Mental
Health, tape recording of proceedings (Apr. 21, 1986) (on file with committee).
195. Id.
196. Ch. 86-220, § 31, 1986 Fla. Laws 1603, 1636 (amending FLA. STAT. § 415.105(4)
(1985)).
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Little of the existing law relating to provision of protective ser-
vices was retained in the 1986 Act. Protective services will now be
provided to any consenting elder or disabled adult determined to
be in need of such services. The elder may refuse services unless
there is reasonable cause to believe that person lacks capacity to
consent. A major deficiency in the existing law was that there was
no definition of incapacity. The new Act defines "lacks capacity to
consent" as being physically or mentally impaired to the extent
that one "lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or
communicate responsible decisions concerning his person."1 9 The
value-laden term "responsible" implies a subjective evaluation
based on individual values. 198 A definition which emphasizes func-
tional incapacity, as indicated by specific recent behavior, might be
preferable.
The 1986 legislation sets forth detailed procedures by which
HRS may petition the court to allow involuntary protective ser-
vices. Great care was taken to protect the due process rights of the
individual involved. Notice of the filing of such a petition must be
given to the person allegedly lacking capacity to consent, his legal
counsel, a spouse, and any known next of kin.199 This addresses the
concern that the aged or disabled person may be too confused to
understand the legal notice. The new Act recognizes the individ-
ual's right to be present and represented by counsel, which will be
appointed if necessary. 00 There is, however, no provision specify-
ing that failure to appear does not constitute a waiver of the right
to appear.21 Neither does the Act require a jury trial before al-
lowing involuntary services. A jury trial would ensure adversarial
proceedings and provide greater protection for the individual's
rights.
The constitutionally sufficient clear and convincing evidence
standard is required to determine that a person lacks capacity to
consent to services.2 2 The hearing does not determine incompe-
tency; it is a limited procedure wherein a temporary guardian is
appointed for one found lacking capacity to consent to protective
197. Id. § 28, 1986 Fla. Laws at 1629 (amending FLA. STAT. § 415.102(11) (1985)).
198. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
199. Ch. 86-220, § 31, 1986 Fla. Laws 1603, 1639 (amending FLA. STAT. § 415.105(5)(f)
(1985)).
200. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 415.105(3) (1985)).
201. See supra text accompanying note 119.
202. Ch. 86-220, § 31, 1986 Fla. Laws 1603, 1637 (amending FLA. STAT. § 415.105(3)(b)
(1985)).
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services.20 3 That guardian's powers include only the right to con-
sent to provision of protective services on behalf of the individual,
whose other civil rights are not disturbed. After sixty days, another
hearing must be conducted to determine if the individual is either
willing to consent or no longer in need of protective services, or if
guardianship proceedings should be initiated. Involuntary services
to otherwise competent adults may not continue indefinitely, and
the individual is protected from lingering in legal limbo-neither
deemed incompetent, nor allowed full control over his life. Only
after sixty days-if the individual still lacks capacity to consent
and it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that protective
services are still needed-are guardianship proceedings instituted.
To preserve continuity of care, services may be continued pending
a determination of competency.0 4
The portion of the new Act setting out emergency procedures is
lengthy and detailed. One of the more significant provisions allows
an HRS worker to forcibly enter a home with a law enforcement
officer and remove an occupant under the following conditions: if
access cannot be gained by consent, if there is "reason to believe
that the situation presents a potential risk of death or immediate
and serious physical harm," and if the emergency cannot be allevi-
ated without such removal 0 The previous law required a court
order prior to removal; the new Act recognizes that delay can be
deadly.
Within twenty-four hours after emergency removal, HRS is re-
quired to petition for court authorization-presumably based on
the petition alone. The court order authorizing the removal and
protective placement must be reviewed within forty-eight hours to
determine if there is probable cause to continue services.2 06 If so,
emergency services may be continued another four days. The new
Act does not require notice of the petition or initial hearing to be
given to anyone; notice is considered impractical under such cir-
cumstances.20 7 There is no specific enunciation of the individual's
right to be present and represented by counsel at an emergency
services hearing. This is consistent with Florida case law indicating
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Ch. 86-220, § 31, 1986 Fla. Laws 1603, 1638 (amending FLA. STAT. § 415.105 (5)(a)
(1985)).
206. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 415.105(5)(e) (1985)).
207. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 415.105(6) (1985)).
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that due process may be relaxed in emergency situations. 0 8 After
four days another hearing, with proper notice, must be held to de-
termine if involuntary services proceedings should be initiated.
These provisions emphasize that only those services necessary to
alleviate the emergency may be provided, and then only when no
other option is available. A preliminary draft allowed chapter 394,
the Baker Act, to be used as an alternative to guardianship pro-
ceedings.0 9 Placing an elderly person in a mental institution is not
usually the least restrictive alternative, so staff revisers removed
that provision.210 The new Act prohibits using the Baker Act to
take individuals into protective custody. The provisions do not
cover situations threatening imminent mental injury-an area the
legislature may want to address in the future.
A major issue raised in public hearings was the need for greater
cooperation between agencies dealing with elder abuse.21' Several
provisions addressing this concern were included in the revised
Act. The Act mandates interagency agreements to facilitate uni-
formity in procedures for investigating and responding to abuse re-
ports.21 2 The term "law enforcement" was in most instances
changed to "criminal justice agency" to include the Medicaid
Fraud Control Unit of the Auditor General's Office, which has stat-
utory authority to investigate alleged abuse and neglect in facilities
receiving Medicaid funds.21 3 Another provision requires criminal
justice agencies which conduct a separate investigation of abuse,
neglect, or exploitation to report the results to HRS. A limited
screening mechanism was also added to discover if any person ap-
plying to operate a facility for aged or disabled adults has ever
been accused of adult or child abuse.21 4
The 1986 revisions to Florida's Adult Protective Services Act are
not only an improvement over previous law, but may in some re-
spects be considered a model for other state legislatures. Of special
208. In re Byrne, 402 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 1981).
209. Fla. H.R. PCB HRS 86-1 (1986) (draft of Feb. 14, 1986). The Baker Act, FLA. STAT.
§ 394.463 (1985), allows for civil commitment of mentally ill persons who are dangerous to
themselves or others.
210. There is some indication that the Baker Act was being used to commit abused
adults in order to provide involuntary care, since no less restrictive mechanism was
available.
211. See Staff Report, supra note 27, at 2.
212. Ch. 86-220, § 32, 1986 Fla. Laws 1603, 1640 (amending FLA. STAT. § 415.106(1)
(1985)).
213. FLA. STAT. § 409.664 (1985); see also Staff Report, supra note 27.
214. Ch. 86-220, § 33, 1986 Fla. Laws 1603, 1642 (amending FLA. STAT. § 441.107(5)
(1985)).
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significance are the detailed procedures for provision of involun-
tary services under emergency and nonemergency conditions.
Along with clarified definitions, these procedures substantially in-
crease due process safeguards for the victim of abuse, while the
confidentiality and notification provisions protect the rights of the
alleged perpetrator.
III. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS
Several issues which should be addressed in future consideration
of the Adult Protective Services Act are discussed. Also, because
guardianship remains the solution of last resort in cases of elder
abuse or exploitiation, needed changes in Florida's Guardianship
Law are also discussed.
A. Adult Protective Services Act
As significant as are the 1986 revisions to the Adult Protective
Services Act, several issues should be considered for future review.
First, further study is needed on the effectiveness of mandatory
reporting statutes for both child and elder abuse. There is some
evidence that ninety-five percent of elderly abuse victims sought
help voluntarily. 15 Mandatory reporting statutes presume that
those being abused are unable or incompetent to ask for help. But
adults of any age in our society must be presumed to be competent
until proven otherwise in a court of law. Where the effectiveness of
mandatory reporting provisions are in doubt, the intrusion on indi-
vidual privacy is indefensible.
The 1986 revisions emphasize criminal prosecution of the
abuser-even modifying legislative intent to include correction of
abuse "through social services and criminal investigation. ' ' 216 The
legislature has sent a message that elder abuse is a crime that will
not be tolerated, even where committed by a family member. The
primary purpose of adult protective services laws, however, should
be to aid the victim, not to prosecute the abuser. In many cases a
criminal "solution" may make the situation worse. The victim may
face retaliation from the abuser.2 1 7 The abuser may be the victim's
only means of support, and arresting and incarcerating the abuser
could result in institutionalization of the victim. As with other do-
215. NATIONAL SENIOR CITIZENS LAW CENTER, supra note 9, at 74.
216. Ch. 86-220, § 27, 1986 Fla. Laws 1603, 1628 (amending FLA. STAT. § 415.101(2)
(1985)).
217. NATIONAL SENIOR CITIZENS LAW CENTER, supra note 9, at 31.
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mestic violence, the causes of elder abuse are complex. Recognizing
this complexity, emphasis should be placed on alternative re-
sponses such as counseling and respite care. Criminal prosecution
could, in many cases, be a simplistic response to a complex
problem.
On a larger scale, consideration should be given to shifting adult
protective services legislation to a model based on spouse abuse.
Adult protective services legislation evolved from child abuse legis-
lation.2 18 There are many similarities in the situations of children
and elderly people-such as a dependency on others for a certain
amount of care.21 9 There are also significant differences. Unlike
children, adults are considered competent under the law. Further-
more, unlike children, adults expect confidentiality in their com-
munications with physicians.2 20
There are also similarities between an abused elder and a bat-
tered spouse.22' Some statistics indicate that approximately one-
fifth of elder abuse is among elderly couples. 2 2 It has never been
seriously suggested, however, that battered spouses be institution-
alized or forced to defend their competency at guardianship pro-
ceedings. Neither are there mandatory reporting provisions to de-
tect spouse abuse. A response similar to that used in spouse abuse
and other domestic violence laws stressing crisis intervention, shel-
ters, and counseling for both abuser and abused might better pro-
tect individuals, while respecting civil rights and allowing the eld-
erly greater self-sufficiency.
B. Guardianship in Florida
Guardianship in Florida is governed by the Florida Guardian-
ship Law.2 23 A guardian is defined as "one to whom the law has
entrusted the custody and control of the person or property, or
both, of an incompetent. 2 2 4 Florida's statutory guardianship pro-
visions are the weak link in the system of protection to elderly and
other vulnerable adults, and deserve the same attention and revi-
sion as the Adult Protective Services Act. Until the 1986 Regular
Session, Florida had only private guardianship. As a result, "a sub-
218. See Katz, supra note 5, at 710.
219. Id. at 716.
220. Faulkner, supra note 64, at 82.
221. Id. at 86.
222. NATIONAL SENIOR CITIZENS LAW CENTER, supra note 9, at 16.
223. FLA. STAT. § 744.101 (1985).
224. Id. § 744.1029(1).
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stantial number of persons adjudicated incompetent have not had
a guardian appointed on their behalf."22 In 1986, the legislature
passed the Public Guardianship Act to provide guardians for in-
competent persons who have "no willing and responsible family
member or friend, other person, bank, or corporation available to
serve as guardian . . . and such person does not have adequate in-
come or wealth for the compensation of a private guardian. 22 6 A
majority of states currently have some form of statutory public
guardianship.2 27 "The consequences of guardianship may be seri-
ous, but the effect of legal incompetence without a guardian, or of
functional incapacity without guardianship assistance, is total lack
of protection. 228
The new Florida law creates a separate office of the Public
Guardian, thereby preventing any conflict of interest.2 9 There is
still work to be done in the guardianship provisions. Due process
protections in the Florida Guardianship Act are minimal; there is
little evidence of the doctrine of least restrictive alternative. If an
adult is adjudged incompetent but is employed and earning wages,
the court may appoint a limited guardian to administer only those
funds and property not earned through the ward's wages.2 30 In all
other circumstances, the guardian gets complete control of the
ward's person, property, or both, and the ward retains no rights.2 31
Frequently, an elderly person can still perform some functions and
make some decisions. The guardianship concept should be ex-
panded to allow appointment of a guardian responsible for only
those functions of which the individual is incapable.
The revised Adult Protective Services Act, in an effort to use the
least restrictive means of aiding the individual, made guardianship
the method of last resort. The concern which motivated the major
revision of Florida's Adult Protective Services Act should now be
focused on the Florida Guardianship Law. Major problems exist as
the law now stands, and the failure adequately to protect individ-
ual rights can have devastating consequences. It is crucial that pro-
posed wards be presumed competent until proven otherwise by
225. Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Jud'y, HB 194 (1986) Staff Analysis 1 (Apr. 25, 1986)
(on file with committee).
226. Ch. 86-120, § 1, 1986 Fla. Laws 355 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 744.702).
227. Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Jud'y, HB 194 (1986) Staff Analysis 1 (Apr. 25, 1986)
(on file with committee).
228. Schmidt, supra note 84, at 359.
229. Ch. 86-120, § 1, 1986 Fla. Laws 355, 356 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 744.703 (1)).
230. FLA. STAT. § 744.303 (1) (1985).
231. Id. § 744.303(2).
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clear and convincing evidence in an adversarial proceeding before a
court of law.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having more elderly citizens in proportion to its population than
other states, Florida is in a position to lead the way in responding
to elderly concerns. As life expectancy and the number of elderly
in this country increases, these issues will require more and more
attention. The reality of a "graying America" will force recognition
of the special needs of older people in medical, social, and political
arenas.
During the 1986 Regular Session, the Florida Legislature sub-
stantially revised the Adult Protective Services Act. By clarifying
definitions used in the statute, providing detailed procedures for
the provision of voluntary and involuntary services, and mandating
greater interagency cooperation, the Act should facilitate protec-
tion of abused elderly and disabled persons while providing sub-
stantial safeguards for their due process rights.
Care must be taken that in our zeal to protect the elderly, we do
not rob them of their fundamental rights. Protection at the ex-
pense of dignity may harm the elderly more than abuse or self-
neglect. When considering this Act in the future, lawmakers should
remember that elderly and disabled persons are adults, not chil-
dren, and are presumed competent under the law. Consideration
should be given to whether the existing Adult Protective Services
Act sufficiently recognizes this difference. Furthermore, until sub-
stantial changes are made to the Florida Guardianship Law to pro-
vide greater due process protections, the legal response to the
needs of vulnerable adults will be, at best, imperfect.
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